哲学专长的可能性及其限度The Possibility and Limits of Philosophical Expertise
陈常燊
摘要(Abstract)：
当今学界围绕哲学专长的争论仍悬而未决：辩护论者分别基于类比论证、技能论证、构成和进步观点等，支持哲学专长的存在；怀疑论者则基于发展性挑战论证、分歧论证等，从实验哲学、经验论和分歧认识论等角度对此进行质疑。争论难以推进的原因在于双方都未能意识到“哲学问题”“哲学专长”等概念在不同语境中的不同含义，从而陷入了概念混淆和论题模糊困境。一方面，区分一阶哲学专长和二阶哲学专长有助于避免上述困境：在一阶哲学专长论题上，怀疑论立场更加可取；而在二阶哲学专长论题上，辩护论立场值得捍卫。另一方面，区分二阶哲学专长与零阶哲学专长有助于澄清哲学专长的可能性及其限度问题：零阶哲学专长是可能的，它是哲学研究或践行的基础；然而零阶哲学专长不是全局专长，不同于哲学权威，也不同于哲学智慧，因此这种可能性不仅应该受到严格限制，还必须遵循认知谦逊要求。总之，区别一阶、二阶和零阶哲学专长有利于解决有关哲学专长的大量问题，也有助于深入思考“哲学何为”这个元哲学问题。
关键词(KeyWords)： 哲学专长;实验哲学;分歧认识论;哲学践行;元哲学
基金项目(Foundation): 国家社科基金重点项目“分析的西方哲学史研究”（项目编号：19AZX013）;国家社科基金后期资助一般项目“维特根斯坦与寂静主义研究”（项目编号：21FZXB042）
作者(Author): 陈常燊
参考文献(References)：
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